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Labour rights in the FTAA 
LANCE COMPA 
Introduction: rejection or engagement? 
Negotiations on the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) bring 
advocates of a strong social dimension in hemispheric economic inte-
gration to a fork in the road: a path of rejection and a path of engage-
ment. On the rejection path, critics point to flaws and failings in existing 
trade-labour linkages in the Americas. Ten years after the adoption of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and its labour side 
agreement, the three member countries of the North American Agree-
ment on Labour Cooperation (NAALC), demonstrate job and wage stag-
nation, growing inequality in labour markets, and continuing violations 
of workers'rights.1 
Similarly, more than a decade after the creation of the Common Market 
of the Southern Cone (Mercosur) and five years after its Social-Labour 
Declaration, workers in Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay face 
wrenching problems of job and wage losses and social inequality. So do 
workers of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), in spite of the far-
reaching Declaration of Labour and Industrial Relations Principles (1993) 
and the Charter of Civil Society (1994).2 In sum, the social provisions of 
trade pacts have failed to protect human rights, workers' rights and labour 
standards. 
The flaws and failings of these labour instruments lead to one 
conclusion: an effective workers' rights regime in the FTAA is an impos-
sible goal, and seeking one is a lost cause. In addition, promoting a social 
dimension in the FTAA, like the NAALC and other regional trade-labour 
instruments, is aiding and abetting abuses by transnational companies 
and investors. It gives political cover to weak-kneed legislators who can 
vote in favour of the FTAA claiming that they support workers' rights 
when in fact the trade-labour link is "toothless" (the favorite epithet of 
critics). 
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Instead, advocates must turn all their energies to torpedoing any agree-
ment. For activists who adopt this view, it means convincing their gov-
ernments to reject a hemispheric trade pact or, where elections are immi-
nent, supporting and electing legislators and presidents who will repudiate 
FTAA talks. 
This paper advocates for the advancement of the engagement path. Not 
from any rose-coloured view of existing labour rights-trade links whose 
flaws and failings are manifest. Rather, from a short-term analysis that 
parliaments and presidents in the Americas are unlikely to renounce a 
hemispheric trade agreement, and from a longer-term view that workers 
can benefit from expanding trade and investment linked to human rights 
and labour rights protection. 
NAFTA countries show no inclination to abandon the FTAA. Hopes of 
anti-FTAA activists that the election of Luis Inacio da Silva as Brazil's pres-
ident would crash hemispheric trade negotiations have faded. Lula had 
earlier characterized FTAA proposals as a US plan for economic "annex-
ation" of Latin America, but upon taking office he declared he would 
bargain hard for an agreement beneficial to Brazil and the other Merco-
sur countries.-3 
If labour rights advocates refuse to promote a workers' rights chapter 
in the FTAA, they could end up with an FTAA with no labour provision 
at all. And, if they succeed in killing the FTAA, they can celebrate for one 
night and wake up the next morning to find that not much has changed. 
The United States and Canada, the developed country engines of the 
hemispheric economy, will continue to seek bilateral trade agreements 
with countries eager for expanded access to North American markets and 
more investment in their economies. 
Hemispheric trade and investment with insufficient regard for workers' 
rights will continue with or without an FTAA. Multinational companies 
and banks might have to account for slightly higher risk premiums in 
making production and investment decisions without FTAA guarantees, 
but they will not walk away from profitable deals. Many countries in 
Latin America and the Caribbean will jump at the chance for a com-
petitive edge vis-a-vis other developing countries through bilateral deals 
with the United States and Canada. Mexico and Chile have done so, and 
Costa Rica with Canada. Since access to US and Canadian markets is 
the main goal of other countries in the hemisphere, the NAALC and its 
variations will likely be the sole model for a workers' rights clause, as it 
was in the Canada-Chile, Canada-Costa Rica, and United States - Chile 
agreements. 
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Without an overall trade agreement containing stronger labour rights 
linkage than that of the NAALC model, advocates will have no central 
forum or mechanism for dealing with workers' rights in the Americas. This 
paper suggests that labour rights advocates can and should shape a new 
viable social dimension in hemispheric trade and demand its inclusion in 
the FTAA. 
The emphasis of this paper is on a viable, not a definitive or triumphant, 
solution. Workers and their advocates do not triumph in the current 
conjuncture of economic and political forces. They do not will their way 
to victory with the sharpness of their criticism or the strength of their 
denunciations; they hold their losses and make small gains where possible. 
Workers' advocates must coldly calculate what can be done with the reality 
they are dealt, hoping the outcomes will advance the longer-term struggle 
for social justice. 
Start over or build on what's been done! 
Commitment to a workers' rights clause in the FTAA raises another issue. 
Should labour rights advocates scrap existing rights models in the hemi-
sphere like the NAALC and its progeny (the United States - Chile, Canada-
Chile and Canada-Costa Rica labour pacts), the Mercosur's Social-Labour 
Declaration, or the CARICOM social charter? Jettisoning those models, 
advocates could demand a totally new worker rights system with interna-
tional standards to which national laws must conform and an oversight 
body empowered to levy economic sanctions on violators. This paper 
argues for an incremental approach integrating positive features of labour 
rights instruments and mechanisms already in place in the hemisphere. 
For some, the European Union (EU) provides an example. Its structure 
includes a commission, parliament and a council setting Europe-wide 
labour standards ("directives") by which national laws must abide. It 
empowers the European Court of Justice to find violations and to order 
countries to change their laws to come into compliance with EU standards. 
Indeed, the EU has all the trappings of a "hard law" legal system like that 
of national systems.4 
But for all its strengths, the EU is not the best model for the Americas. 
Countries involved in FTAA talks are not even remotely contemplating 
EU-style structural integration. Moreover, the EU social dimension is not 
nearly as strong as its institutional framework suggests. Directives set-
ting European labour standards are few, and they cover less thorny issues 
such as health and safety, parental leave, and employee "works councils" 
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entitled to information and consultation, but not to collective bargaining. 
The EU treaty specifically excludes collective bargaining, union organiz-
ing and the right to strike from Europe-wide standard setting.5 These 
issues are so embedded in national institutions, histories, cultures and 
class struggles that no European country is willing to hand them over to 
supranational rule. 
Various European social charters broadly address labour rights and 
labour standards. In December of 2000, the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union was adopted at a summit meeting in Nice. 
The Nice charter replaced the 1989 Community Charter of Basic Social 
Rights. An EU "convention" crafting a new union treaty had proposed 
incorporating the charter into the EU's constitutional structure, suppos-
edly making it binding and enforceable, but such a move is still far from 
complete.6 
The charter and its forerunners have always been non-binding "side 
agreements" to the EU treaty. They are important as guiding principles 
and points of reference for EU institutions, but they do not yield enforce-
able rights. National authorities and national courts can ignore them. 
Countries sometimes even ignore orders from the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) on cases stemming from violations of Europe-wide direc-
tives, which are supposed to be binding and enforceable. For example, for 
a decade, France ignored an ECJ order to repeal its labour law prohibiting 
night work by women. The ECJ held that the law discriminated against 
women, but there is no European police or European marshal to enforce 
that court order.7 
Creating a supranational tribunal empowered to overrule national laws 
and courts risks turning the wrong direction. For example, the ECJ struck 
down a German state's affirmative action law favouring women's move-
ment into public sector supervisory jobs. The court held that this was 
"reverse discrimination" forbidden by EU equality directives, and ordered 
Germany to nullify their law.8 
Even if the EU's social dimension were a robust one driving labour 
standards higher and punishing workers' rights violators (granted that 
it is more advanced than Americas' models), importing it into a trade 
pact is impractical. Both large and small countries in this hemisphere are 
not going to say, "We're at sea on workers' rights, we don't know how 
to do this, so we'll borrow the EU model." They are going to negotiate a 
homegrown social dimension to hemispheric trade. 
Binding, enforceable international labour standards remain an over-
arching goal for worker rights advocates. However, getting from here to 
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there in a single bound in an FTAA is not possible, especially when so 
much economic disparity marks the negotiating parties. Smaller, weaker 
countries naturally fear that universal standards will be applied to them, 
but not to bigger economic powers. Moreover, each country has its own 
political and jurisdictional barriers to supranational labour authority. For 
example, Canadian provinces already enjoy and jealously guard provincial 
sovereignty in most labour affairs. They are not interested in surrendering 
their power to the federal government, let alone to a new international 
authority. 
On the trade union side, activists in other countries look at the condi-
tion of workers' rights in the United States and recoil at the prospect of 
homogenized labour standards tending toward the US model. US trade 
unionists ought to be equally sceptical about solving their own prob-
lems through some kind of international legal legerdemain. Trade-labour 
instruments are not going to reverse deficiencies in US law - NLRB elec-
tion rules, striker replacements, contingent workers' lack of protection 
and others - without action by Congress.9 These are problems for US 
workers to tackle through their own organizing and political action, not 
by demanding a silver bullet in a trade and labour pact. 
The embedded national framework of labour rights and labour stan-
dards did not take shape casually. In each country, it resulted from national 
histories replete with anti-colonial wars, civil wars, constitutional crises, 
domestic regional conflicts and class struggles. Thirty-four countries sit-
ting down to negotiate a social dimension to a hemispheric trade agree-
ment are not going to undo those histories and defer to an untested 
supranational authority. 
Many governments involved in FTAA talks have already committed 
themselves to addressing workers' rights in trade arrangements. Their 
specific labour agreements are still evolving, but they are enough to lay a 
foundation for new movement in FTAA negotiations. Instead of a harsh 
demand that governments leap.into the unknown with a new suprana-
tional system, a softer demand to build upon blocks already in place is 
one that a strong civil society movement can persuade governments to 
adopt. 
Labour rights in existing regional trade agreements 
I am not going to recite all of the institutional structures, procedures, 
case histories and other aspects of labour rights provisions related to 
various regional trade agreements. However, a brief description of the 
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main features of the NAALC, the Mercosur Social-Labour Declaration, 
and the CARICOM Social Charter will set the stage for what follows. 
This paper aims to explore the prospect of weaving together the "best 
practices" into a new plan that labour rights advocates can support and 
that governments can accept.10 
The NAALC 
The NAALC sets forth eleven "Labour Principles" that the three signatory 
countries have committed themselves to promote: 
freedom of association and protection of the right to organize; 
the right to bargain collectively; 
the right to strike; 
forced labour; 
child labour; 
minimum wage, hours of work and other labour standards; 
non-discrimination; 
equal pay for equal work; 
occupational safety and health; 
workers' compensation; and 
migrant worker protection. 
The NAALC signatories have pledged to effectively enforce their national 
labour laws in these eleven subject areas, and have agreed to be subjected 
to critical reviews of their performance by the other countries. 
With regard to the eleven labour principles, these countries, adopted 
six "obligations" for the effective enforcement of these principles. These 
obligations include: 
• a general duty to provide high labour standards; 
• effective enforcement of labour laws; 
• access to administrative and judicial fora for workers whose rights are 
violated; 
• due process, transparency, speed, and effective remedies in labour law 
proceedings; 
• public availability of labour laws and regulations, and opportunity for 
"interested persons" to comment on proposed changes; and 
• promoting public awareness of labour law and workers' rights. 
Key to understanding the NAALC is to highlight the two things that it 
does not do. Firstly, it does not set new common standards to which 
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countries must adjust their laws and regulations. Instead, the NAALC 
stresses sovereignty in each country's internal labour affairs, recognizing 
"the right of each Party to establish its own domestic labour standards". 
Secondly, the NAALC does not create a supranational tribunal that 
hears evidence, decides guilt or innocence in labour disputes or orders 
remedies against violators. This role is left to national authorities applying 
national law. Nor does it create a supranational judicial review body to 
hear appeals from decisions of national tribunals and overrule decisions 
that arguably fail to "enforce" the NAALC. Decisions by the national 
courts are left undisturbed by the NAALC. 
Instead of an international enforcement system, the NAALC countries 
have created an oversight, review and dispute resolution system designed 
to hold each other accountable for performance in the eleven defined 
areas of labour law. Oversight is conducted by a review body of another 
government. Then, depending on the subject area, an evaluation and 
arbitration is held by an independent, non-governmental committee or 
panel. 
Under this process, trade unionists and their allies file complaints on 
one or more of the labour principles in a new institutional structure that 
provides for investigations, public hearings, written reports, government-
to-government consultations, independent evaluations, non-binding rec-
ommendations and other "soft law" measures common to most interna-
tional agreements. At each stage of this process, advocates can intervene 
to press for favourable outcomes. 
A National Administrative Office (NAO) in the labour department of 
each country receives complaints ("public communications" or "submis-
sions" in NAALC parlance) from the public related to any of the eleven 
labour principles. There are no restrictions on who may file a complaint. 
In the interest of having the process as open and accessible as possible, 
the regulations of each NAO set a fairly low threshold of acceptance for 
review.11 
The scope of such reviews is "labour law matters arising in the territory 
of another Party" This is an unusual but critical feature of the NAALC. 
Employers, workers, unions and allied NGOs must file their submissions 
with the NAO in another country, not the country where alleged violations 
occurred, to commence the review process. The United States and Canada 
hold public hearings on complaints with transcripts and sworn testimony. 
The Mexican NAO holds private "informative sessions". 
The NAOs issue public reports on the submissions that they have 
accepted for review. The public report contains a key make-or-break 
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conclusion: whether or not it recommends ministerial consultations. If 
no recommendations are made, the matter is closed. If recommendations 
are provided, the matter moves forward. These ministerial consultations 
are open-ended efforts to resolve a problem before it enlarges. They have 
generally led to further hearings, special research reports, seminars and 
conferences, worker education programmes and the like. 
A "hard law" edge has been applied to three of the labour principles: 
those covering minimum wages, child labour, and occupational safety and 
health. An independent arbitral panel is empowered to fine an offend-
ing government for a "persistent pattern of failure to effectively enforce" 
domestic labour law. If the fine is not paid, the panel can.apply trade sanc-
tions on the firm, industry, or sector where the workers' rights violations 
occurred.12 
In sum, the NAALC is not a full-fledged international enforcement 
mechanism. It is not intended to resolve specific complaints and to issue 
orders to reinstate workers unjustly discharged, orders to recognize and 
bargain with trade unions, orders to remove children from unlawful 
labour, orders to adjust pay for women to equal that of men, orders to 
install air filters to reduce health hazards, orders to provide compensa-
tion to injured workers, and other remedies associated with labour law 
enforcement. These matters are left to national legislation and national 
enforcement mechanisms. 
The NAALC is intended as a review mechanism by which member 
countries open themselves up to investigation, reports, evaluations, rec-
ommendations and other measures so that over time enhanced oversight 
and scrutiny will generate more effective labour law enforcement. To the 
extent that legislative responses can be fashioned within national sys-
tems, rather than imposed by a supranational power, oversight under the 
NAALC can change the climate for labour law reform in each country to 
achieve greater adherence to NAALC principles and obligations. 
Mercosur and the Social-Labour Declaration 
When the Common Market of the South (Mercosur)13 took shape in 1991, 
a reference to "social justice" in the Preamble of the Treaty of Asuncion 
was the only nod to a social dimension in regional trade plans. Mer-
cosur countries quickly realized the need to respond to the demands 
of workers, trade unions and allied civil society forces for instruments 
and mechanisms to ensure that expanding regional trade did not create 
new incentives for social dumping and worker exploitation to obtain a 
compel 
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competitive advantage. That same year, labour ministers of the member 
countries responded to demands fronrlabour and civil society by adopt-
ing the Montevideo Declaration insisting that the trade group address 
labour and social issues. 
The 1994 Protocol of Ouro Preto finalized Mercosur's institutional 
structure and created two new organisms on labour matters: "Work-
ing Group 10" (WG10) and a new body called the Economic and Social 
Consultative Forum. WG10 is composed of labour ministry officials of 
each Mercosur member government in a tripartite government-labour-
business structure, with one representative from each sector in each of 
the four countries. Labour and business representatives have the right to 
participate and vote in committees on conclusions and recommendations 
to send to the full Working Group. 
A parallel structure is established within each country. Country com-
mittees have often invited non-governmental organizations like consumer 
groups, international organizations like the ILO, and labour centrals that 
might not have a seat on the committee to participate in committee meet-
ings. Both national committees and WG10 have contracted with experts 
for special working groups or technical committees on particular subject 
matters. 
WG10 also created a permanent Labour Market Observatory. The 
Observatory is a technical organ designed to provide "real-time" compar-
ative information on labour market indicators to Mercosur governments 
to help them coordinate employment policies. Like other Mercosur social 
initiatives, the Observatory has a tripartite institutional structure. A 12-
member management council named by WG10 oversees a secretariat of 
experts from each country selected by the country's tripartite national 
section. 
The Economic and Social Consultative Forum (ESCF) is a setting for 
trade unions, employers and non-governmental organizations to voice 
their views and concerns about economic integration in the region. Like 
other Mercosur institutions, the ESCF is tripartite in structure, but with a 
key distinction: the Forum does not include government representatives. 
The three sectors of the ESCF are labour, business and NGOs. 
Each of the four Mercosur countries have nine seats on the ESCF, cre-
ating a plenary body of 36 members. Each country may choose through 
its internal processes its nine members, with the sole requirement that 
labour and business seats be equal. Thus, for example, labour and busi-
ness could have two seats each, opening up five seats to NGOs. In practice, 
these countries have generally chosen three labour and three business 
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representatives, with three NGO representatives joining them in the 
national delegation. NGO participants have come from consumer, envi-
ronmental, educational, legal and other civil society groups. 
The ESCF began functioning in 1996 after its four national sections were 
formed. It is strictly an advisory body, able only to forward non-binding 
recommendations to governments. The Forum provides space for civil 
society sectors in each country to learn about each other's concerns, to 
develop institutional rules, procedures and customs for tripartite work, 
and to seek common ground on social aspects of regional economic inte-
gration. These were important precursors to the new framework created 
by the Social-Labour Declaration of Mercosur. 
Social-Labour Declaration of Mercosur 
The Social-Labour Declaration of 10 December 1998 and the move to 
create a Mercosur Social-Labour Commission are the most significant 
developments in the region. Emitted not by a working group or even a 
council of ministers, but by the heads of state of the four Mercosur mem-
ber countries, the declaration has exceptional solemnity and authorita-
tiveness. The creation of a new, permanent Social-Labour Commission 
gives added impetus to the social dimension in Mercosur. 
In its Preamble, the declaration invokes ILO Conventions such as the 
1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1995 Copenhagen sum-
mit and other multilateral and regional human rights instruments. The 
content of the declaration covers the usual core labour standards - free-
dom of association, child labour, forced labour and non-discrimination. 
However, it ranges beyond the usual core to address migrant workers' 
rights, the right to strike, social dialogue, employment and unemploy-
ment, training, health and safety, labour inspection and social security.14 
The declaration does not establish harmonized norms and has no link-
age to the Mercosur trade regime imposing economic sanctions for viola-
tions of workers' rights - key trade union goals for a social charter. Rather, 
the member countries "commit themselves to respect the fundamental 
rights inscribed in this declaration and to promote its application in con-
formity with national law and practice and with collective contracts and 
agreements". In its closing article, the declaration states: "The States Party 
emphasize that their Declaration and its follow-up mechanisms cannot 
be invoked or used for other ends not contained herein; prohibited, in 
particular, is its application to trade, economic, and financial matters." 
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Social-Labour Commission 
The declaration's application and follow-up clause creates a tripartite 
Mercosur Social-Labour Commission that reports to the Common Mar-
ket Group (CMG). Composed of twelve government, labour and business 
members (one per sector per country), the Commission is empowered to 
act by consensus to: 
• review annual reports from governments; 
• develop recommendations; 
• examine "difficulties and mistakes in the application and fulfilment" of 
the declaration; 
• write its own analyses and reports on application and fulfilment; and, 
• shape proposals for modifying the text of the declaration. 
Each government must submit an annual report to the Commission on 
changes in national law and practice on matters addressed in the decla-
ration, on progress in promoting the declaration, and on difficulties in 
applying it. Based on an examination of these reports, the Commission 
prepares a comprehensive report to the CMG. 
As with the NAALC, Mercosur governments are reluctant to cede 
sovereign power over labour matters to a new, untested supranational 
authority or to create international norms that trump national law. 
Employers complain that the Social-Labour Declaration is too favourable 
to the trade union agenda and fails to promote much needed (from 
their perspective) flexibilization of labour law and practice in the region. 
However, they count as a victory the fact that the declaration does not 
have linkage to trade disciplines with potential for economic sanctions. 
Unions see the declaration as lacking "teeth" precisely because it does 
not establish harmonized standards or trade sanctions against labour 
rights violators. Furthermore, it fails to halt harmful (from their point of 
view) trends toward greater flexibility, whether such changes stem from de 
facto moves by management or from labour law reforms often demanded 
by the International Monetary Fund or other international financial insti-
tutions. In the trade unions' view, such flexibilization undermines work-
ers' rights won through decades of struggle, including the struggle against 
military dictatorships in all four Mercosur countries. 
At the same time, trade unions welcome the significant role afforded 
to labour in the tripartite structure of the Commission. They have seen a 
broadening and deepening of social dialogue, which they view as progress 
in the long march toward an effective social dimension in trade.15 
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The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Charter of 
Civil Society 
CARICOM is an association of Caribbean nations created in 1973 to 
develop a common market and coordinated policies among its member 
states.16 Faced with the rise of regional trade agreements around them, and 
in particular, the new comparative advantages afforded to Mexico under 
NAFTA, CARICOM countries accelerated efforts to overcome strong dis-
tinctions and rivalries and built an effective trade group.17 
CARICOM's social dimension is grounded in the Charter of Civil Soci-
ety of the Caribbean Community, signed in 1994 and adopted by the 
countries in 1997. The purpose of the Charter is captured in the follow-
ing statement by the commission: 
CARICOM needs normative moorings; we have found widespread yearning 
for giving the community a qualitative character - values beyond the routine 
of integration arrangements to which [economic integration] can be made 
to conform. The Charter can become the soul of the Community which 
needs a soul if it is to command the loyalty of the people of CARICOM.18 
The Charter of Civil Society is a comprehensive human rights instrument 
composed of 27 articles. Most notably, in comparison with similar inter-
national efforts, the CARICOM Charter subjects private actors - "social 
partners"19 - as well as states to its oversight mechanism. 
The first grouping of articles covers classical civil and political rights -
human dignity and the right to life, liberty and security of the person; 
equality before the law; political freedom; freedom of association, expres-
sion and religion. Article X on cultural diversity shifts the instrument's 
focus to economic and social rights as reflected in its clauses on indige-
nous peoples, women, children and the disabled; access to education and 
training; health; participation in the economy; environmental rights; and 
good governance. 
Two articles of the Charter relate to a social dimension. Article XIX 
on Workers' Rights is the longest article of the Charter. It guarantees to 
"every worker" the right to form or belong to a trade union, to bargain 
collectively, to reasonable hours and pay, to withhold his or her labour, to 
a safe workplace, and not to be subjected to unfair labour practices. An 
exception is made for public employees which is said to be "reasonably 
justifiable in a free and democratic society". 
Article XIX enumerates the obligations of governments to: 
• safeguard workers' right to freely choose occupations; 
• recognize the desirability of decent pay; 
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• provide machinery for recognition and certification of trade unions 
freely chosen by a majority of workers; 
• sensitize workers, unions and employers as to their respective and 
mutual obligations; 
• provide protection against arbitrary dismissal; 
• provide machinery for industrial dispute resolution; 
• provide maternity leave and return-to-work rights after pregnancy; 
• establish standards to ensure a safe and healthy workplace; 
• provide adequate social security; and 
• ensure social and medical assistance to retired persons. 
Article XXII on Social Partners states briefly the undertaking of each 
government to establish a framework for genuine consultation among its 
social partners on the objectives, contents and implementation of national 
economic and social programmes and their respective roles and respon-
sibilities in good governance. 
The follow-up mechanism in Article XXV calls for periodic reports 
to the CARICOM Secretary-General on measures adopted and progress 
achieved in compliance with the Charter. Reports are to indicate "fac-
tors and difficulties, if any" affecting implementation. Governments are 
advised to consult with social partners in preparing the reports, and estab-
lish in each country a National Committee to oversee Charter imple-
mentation. The National Committee is to be made up of government 
representatives, representatives of the social partners, and "other persons 
of high moral character and recognized competence in their respective 
fields of endeavor". 
The Charter contains a complaint mechanism by which citizens may 
file with their National Committee "reports of allegations of breaches of, 
or non-compliance with" the Charter. Significantly, complaints may cite 
violations "attributed to the state or to one or more social partners" 
The National Committee must notify the state or social partner named 
in the complaint and request comments on the allegation. The com-
plaint, comments and the Committee's "own views" are then reported to 
the Secretary-General for forwarding to the Conference of Heads of Gov-
ernments of the Caribbean Community. The deliberations of the Confer-
ence and any recommendations are sent back to the government and the 
National Committee of the country involved. 
No further action is contemplated under the CARICOM Charter in 
situations alleging violations of Charter provisions, including workers' 
rights. The Charter establishes an oversight system relying on peer pres-
sure and moral force to change behaviour or to correct injustices. There is 
258 LANCE COMPA 
no linkage to CARICOM trading arrangements and no plan for economic 
sanctions against human rights and workers' rights violators. 
Gleaning positive elements 
An institutional role for civil society actors 
In FTAA talks to date, governments have declared their intention to engage 
civil society on a social dimension in trade. Labour rights advocates should 
demand action through a labour rights chapter promoting a strong insti-
tutional role for civil society actors. The NAALC and NAALC-like agree-
ments are weak on civil society involvement. They allow private parties 
to file complaints under the agreement, but after an initial filing there is 
no right of appeal or advancement to higher levels of the procedure. Such 
advancements are entirely controlled by governments. 
NAALC-style agreements include trade union and employer represen-
tatives on advisory committees, but these committees are largely inactive. 
Applying the labour agreement is strictly a government-to-government 
operation with civil society marginalized. 
In contrast, Mercosur and CARICOM provide valuable models of 
openness to civil society and respect for social actors. Mercosur created a 
civil society Economic and Social Consultative Forum (ESCF) for busi-
ness, labour and NGOs to develop recommendations on human rights, 
labour and environmental matters in its member countries. Like other 
Mercosur institutions, the ESCF is tripartite in structure, but the three 
parts are non-governmental. Each of the four countries have nine seats 
on the ESCF, making for a plenary body of thirty-six members. Each 
country may choose through its internal processes the nine members to 
be drawn from business, trade union and NGO communities. The sole 
proviso is that business and labour representatives must be equal in num-
ber. In practice, countries have come up with three representatives from 
each constituency: labour, business and NGOs. NGO participants come 
from consumer, environmental, educational, legal and other civil society 
groups. 
Mercosur has also created a Social-Labour Commission (SLC) under 
the declaration with ample space for trade union participation in setting 
a social agenda for member countries. The twelve-member SLC includes 
one labour, business and government representative from each of the four 
parties. This commission reviews annual government reports on labour 
law and practice, progress in promoting the declaration, and problems in 
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applying it. The SLC examines each country's report and prepares its own 
comprehensive analysis and recommendations to Mercosur's governing 
body, including proposals for changes to the declaration. 
The Mercosur SLC is complemented by a national labour-business-
government commission in each country, as well as sectoral commissions 
in textile, transportation, agriculture, telecommunications and other 
industries. Again, results should not be overstated. Recommendations 
flowing from this tripartite process are non-binding. However, requiring 
country self-reporting and forging consensus critiques and recommen-
dations with the labour movement's full, equal participation is a valuable 
model for a hemispheric institutional setting. Moreover, the SLC has fos-
tered innovative regional developments such as cross-border collective 
bargaining (for example, between Volkswagen and metalworkers unions 
in Brazil and Argentina)20 and the unusual step of joint child labour and 
job safety inspections by multinational teams of enforcement officials 
from labour departments of member countries. 
Borrowing from European discourse, CARICOM's Charter of Civil 
society sets out obligations not only for member governments, but also 
for "social partners" including trade unions, corporations and NGOs. 
In each country, a national committee made up of government officials, 
representatives of the social partners, and respected independent scholars 
and experts oversees the implementation of this Charter. 
Complaint mechanisms 
A strong institutional role guaranteeing a permanent "seat at the table" 
for trade unions and other civil society actors is an important feature 
in Mercosur and CARICOM's social dimension. This is lacking in the 
NAALC and its progeny. However, participatory mechanisms leading to 
consultations and recommendations are not enough. A robust complaint 
system is needed to give a voice and recourse to workers victimized by 
labour rights violations and to advocates who can act on behalf of victims. 
Mercosur and CARICOM lack such a mechanism, whereas the NAALC 
has something important to offer. 
The NAALC and its offshoots have several positive elements of a com-
plaint mechanism to weave into a new FTAA labour rights system. For 
one, the NAALC has no "standing" requirement that only victims or only 
trade unions or only citizens can file complaints about workers' rights 
violations. "Any person", meaning any individual or any organization, 
alone or in concert, regardless of citizenship, can file a complaint (called a 
w 
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"public communication" in the soft diplomatic language of the NAALC) 
about violations of one or more of the eleven labour principles and the 
failure of a government to effectively enforce related laws. 
In practice, most NAALC complaints have been submitted jointly by 
trade unions, human rights organizations, independent worker support 
groups and others from two or three countries working from a cross-
border alliance. Indeed, the NAALC's unusual requirement for complaints 
about violations in one country to be filed in another member country 
(to avoid conflict with national labour law bodies) forces advocates to 
work collaboratively in international coalitions, a valuable spin-off effect 
of the NAALC. 
A new hemispheric labour rights regime should preserve the ample 
use of consultation with complainants, public hearings, commissioned 
research and detailed reports like those by the National Administrative 
Offices (NAOs) of the NAALC countries. Public hearings, in particular, 
allow affected workers and their advocates to state their claims through 
dramatic first-hand testimony. Hearings also create opportunities for 
protests, press conferences and other elements of strategic media cam-
paigns. 
Another favourable element in the NAALC complaint system is the 
absence of a requirement that complainants "exhaust" national mecha-
nisms before resorting to the NAALC. Exhaustion of national remedies is 
a requirement of the Inter-American Commission and Court of Human 
Rights, for example. This severely crimps the timeliness of using it, since 
in most countries appeal procedures can take years before a case is finally 
resolved. Under the NAALC, aggrieved workers and their advocates can 
file unfair labour practice charges with their national authorities on Mon-
day and with another country's NAO on Tuesday. 
Targeting corporate abusers 
CARICOM countries recognized that in the context of regional economic 
integration, the power of multinational corporations over workers' rights 
and labour standards often exceeds the governments' power to regulate 
them. Thus, CARICOM expressly allows complaints against corporations 
as well as governments for violations of workers' rights provisions in the 
Charter of Civil Society. 
NAALC complaints technically run against governments' failure to 
effectively enforce national laws. In practice, targeted governments have 
been joined in the dock by corporate abusers of workers' rights. Cases are 
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called the GE case, the Sony case, the Duro Bag case (all cases "against" 
Mexico), the Sprint case ("against" the United States), the McDonald's case 
("against" Canada) and so on. Enforcement is the focus of the NAALC, but 
the questions "enforcement of what?" and "enforcement against whom?" 
cannot be delinked from the inquiry. When the US NAO first sought pub-
lic comment on its proposed regulations, employer groups demanded a 
prohibition on naming any corporation in a complaint or in an NAO 
report.21 
Workers' rights violations do not occur in a vacuum; they occur in 
a defined place and time, and usually in a place of employment. Fortu-
nately, the US NAO rejected this employer demand so that complaints 
could weave together allegations about countries' failure to effectively 
enforce their laws in connection with specific workers' rights abuses by 
corporations.22 
In the years since it took effect, NAFTA's labour side agreement has 
given rise to a varied, rich experience of international labour rights 
advocacy. Nearly thirty complaints and cases on behalf of workers in 
all three countries have arisen under the NAALC. They embrace work-
ers' organizing and bargaining efforts, occupational safety and health, 
migrant worker protection, minimum employment standards, discrim-
ination against women, compensation for workplace injuries, and other 
issues. 
A rapid summary of just a few cases demonstrates how advocates get 
results. Gains are not made through direct enforcement by an interna-
tional tribunal, but through indirection, by exploiting the spaces cre-
ated by this new labour rights instrument to strengthen cross-border ties 
among labour rights advocates and to generate unexpected pressures on 
governments and on transnational enterprises. To be effective, labour 
rights advocates using the agreement must seek help from their counter-
parts across the border. 
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In 1996, the provincial government of Alberta announced plans to priva-
tize workplace health and safety enforcement. Labour inspectors would 
have become independent contractors. The public employees' union 
declared it would file a NAALC complaint charging Alberta with not 
just a failure, but with a complete abdication of its responsibility to 
effectively enforce health and safety laws. The government dropped its 
plan.23 
In 1996, Mexican labour authorities dissolved a small democratic trade 
union in the fisheries ministry when that agency merged with a larger 
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environmental ministry, who held larger pro-government bargaining 
rights. Together with US human rights groups, the dissident union filed 
a NAALC complaint in the United States alleging failure to enforce the 
Mexican constitutional guarantee of freedom of association. At a public 
hearing in Washington, DC, Mexican government officials and leaders 
of both Mexican unions, labour law experts from both countries, and US 
labour and human rights advocates testified, generating wide publicity 
in both countries and a sharply critical report by the US NAO. As a result, 
the smaller dissident union regained its registration and has continued 
its activity in the democratic union movement.24 
• A 1997 complaint by a coalition of US and Mexican labour, human 
rights and women's rights groups challenged the widespread practice 
of pregnancy testing in the maquiladora factories. A public hearing in 
Texas exposed the involvement of well-known US companies such as 
General Motors and Zenith which led to a US NAO report confirming 
the abuses.25 Several US multinational firms announced that they would 
halt the practice and advocacy groups in Mexico launched new efforts 
seeking legislative reform to halt pregnancy testing in employment. 
In 2003, Mexico adopted a new far-reaching anti-discrimination law 
prohibiting pregnancy testing and other forms of discrimination against 
women.26 
• A 1999 complaint to the US NAO by flight attendants' unions in the 
United States and Mexico charged Mexico with failing to enforce the 
right to freedom of association by denying flight attendants represented 
by a "wall-to-wall" pro-government union at the TAESA airline the 
right to form an independent union. A March 2000 public hearing in 
Washington, DC buttressed the workers' claims and demonstrated inter-
national support for Mexican flight attendants who undertook protest 
actions in major airports. Later in 2000, in a parallel situation at another 
airline, the Mexican government reversed its stance and allowed flight 
attendants to vote separately on union representation to avoid a new 
round of international scrutiny.27 
• Canadian and US unions filed a NAALC complaint with the US NAO 
in 1998 after McDonald's closed a Montreal restaurant where workers 
had formed a union. The complaint targeted flaws in Quebec's labour 
law that allowed companies to close work sites based on anti-union 
motivation. When the US NAO accepted the complaint and sched-
uled public hearings, Quebec trade unions, employer federations, and 
labour department officials agreed to resolve the matter in a labour 
code reform bill rather than have Quebec's labour policies aired in a US 
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public hearing. The unions withdrew their complaint and the hearing 
was cancelled.28 
• Twenty-five unions, health and safety advocacy groups, human rights 
organizations and an allied community support network filed a major 
complaint with the US NAO in 2000 for workers suffering egregious 
health and safety violations at two Auto-Trim manufacturing plants in 
the maquiladora region. The 100-page complaint reflects long and care-
ful collaboration among the filing organizations, a high level of technical 
competency and legal argument, and a powerful indictment of the gov-
ernment's failure to enforce health and safety laws.29 These advocates 
filed a parallel complaint with Canada's NAO, and the two complaints 
led to a series of public hearings and sharply critical reports. Mexico 
claimed to strengthen its health and safety enforcement in response to 
the complaints. The labour-community coalition was not satisfied, but 
claimed for its part the creation of a permanent new network of health 
and safety advocates in North America. 
• The Washington state apple case is a rich example of strategic use of the 
NAALC and how it can foster new ties of solidarity. More than 50,000 
Mexican workers labour in the orchards and processing plants of the 
largest apple-growing region in the United States. Employers crushed 
their efforts throughout the 1990s to form trade unions, to bargain 
collectively, to have job health and safety protection, to end discrimina-
tion, and to attain other workplace gains. In 1997, the Teamsters union 
and the United Farm Workers agreed to develop a NAALC case on 
these issues. They reached out for support from Mexican unions, farm 
worker advocacy groups, and human rights organizations, and filed a 
NAALC complaint with the NAO of Mexico. In December of 1998, a 
hearing was held in Mexico City, with widespread media coverage.30 
The Mexico NAO report and follow-up ministerial consultations ini-
tiated a campaign involving workers which lasted for over a year and 
attained a number of gains for workers.31 For example, international 
scrutiny under the NAALC helped convince two large apple warehouse 
companies to agree to a "card-check" certification which led to union 
recognition.32 
In each of the aforementioned examples, new alliances were built among 
groups that had hardly ever communicated until the NAALC complaint 
gave them a concrete venue for working together. For leaders and activists 
of independent Mexican trade unions in particular, access to international 
allies and to a mechanism for scrutiny of repressive tactics long hidden 
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from international public view provided strength and protection to build 
their movement.33 
This accounting is not meant to overstate the NAALC's impact. Each 
of the examples provided are more complicated than these capsule sum-
maries can convey, and the advantages gained are uneven. Asking workers 
to turn to the NAALC to air their grievances must be joined by honest cau-
tions that it cannot directly result in regained jobs, union recognition, or 
back pay for violations. Unions and allied groups have to weigh the value 
of using the NAALC in light of staff time, energy and resources that might 
be allocated elsewhere when a specific payoff in new members or new 
collective agreements cannot be promised. Gains come obliquely, over 
time, by pressing companies and governments to change their behaviour, 
by sensitizing public opinion, by building ties of solidarity, and by tak-
ing other steps to change the climate for the advancement of workers' 
rights. 
The NAALC allows transnational social actors to demand investiga-
tions, public hearings and government consultations on workers' rights 
violations. Advocates now have the opportunity to strategize and plan 
together in a sustained fashion, gathering evidence for drafting a com-
plaint, crafting its elements, setting priorities, defining demands, launch-
ing media campaigns, meeting with government officials to set the agenda 
for a hearing and to press them for thorough reviews and follow-up, 
preparing to testify in public hearings, engaging technical experts to but-
tress a case with scientific elements (a health and safety case, for example), 
influencing the composition of independent experts' panels and the terms 
of reference of their investigation among other concrete tasks. 
This is not meant to be a wide-eyed endorsement of using the NAALC at 
every opportunity. Choices about resource allocation and measurement 
of potential gains have to be made. Actors face unavoidable compro-
mises using instruments and procedures created by governments more 
attuned to corporate concerns than to workers' interests. But given the 
structurally defensive position of workers in a corporate-dominated sys-
tem, sole reliance on denunciation, confrontation and rejection, while 
scorning involvement in efforts to link workers' rights to trade or to 
use the inevitably flawed agreements that follow, surrenders the chance 
for a savvy, strategic exploitation of pressure points found in interna-
tional human rights and labour rights instruments, however flawed they 
may be, compared with what labour rights advocates would create on 
their own without governments or transnational enterprises to contend 
with. 
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Research and oversight bodies 
The NAALC created a small permanent Secretariat (originally placed 
in Dallas, Texas, but now in Washington, DC) to serve as the research 
and administrative arm of the council of labour ministers. A half-dozen 
economists, lawyers and labour policy experts from the three member 
countries have produced valuable, book-length comparative labour law 
and labour market studies, along with shorter guides to workers' rights.34 
Mercosur has created a social-labour Observatorio to monitor devel-
opments and produce reports and analyses on labour markets and work-
ers' rights in member countries.35 The Observatorio has produced valu-
able comparative studies on child labour, discrimination, social dialogue, 
migration, job creation, training and other important topics. 
The NAALC Secretariat and the Mercosur Observatorio provide solid 
models for a new, hemispheric labour rights research and reporting body. 
Such new body should have an adequate staff and budget to carry out an 
expanded programme, and it should have guarantees of greater indepen-
dence in its work. Its mandate should also include strengthened oversight 
on the efficacy of labour rights mechanisms in a hemispheric agreement, 
"blowing the whistle" when governments and companies violate workers' 
rights and exposing failures to provide effective enforcement and reme-
dies. 
Enforcement 
The ever-present question of "teeth" in labour rights-trade linkage arises 
in the FTAA context. Critics have lambasted all the models discussed 
in this paper for lacking teeth, for not providing specific remedies like 
reinstatement of workers dismissed for union organizing, recognition 
of independent unions, enforceable orders to halt pregnancy testing in 
maquiladora factories, and other on-the-ground targets of NAALC or 
CARICOM complainants. 
Such criticism is fair. However, we have to recognize that countries are 
not going to set up a supranational mechanism that can overturn national 
labour laws and overrule national supreme courts in labour cases. Instead, 
international labour rights mechanisms provide new opportunities to fos-
ter organizing and solidarity. Advocates make gains indirectly, when using 
these labour rights mechanisms as part of a broader strategy of workplace 
organizing and cross-border solidarity campaigns. We can shape even 
farther-reaching opportunities in a hemispheric setting. 
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The NAALC and its progeny have some teeth in the form of potential 
fines or trade sanctions against countries or sectors that violate workers' 
rights. However, no case has ever reached such a point. Only member 
governments, not social actors, can invoke the sanctions phase of the 
NAALC process. 
Applying sanctions is unlikely while governments control the process. 
They too often put superficial cooperation ahead of honest engagement 
and criticism on workers' rights violations. However, preserving the sanc-
tions option is a critical goal in FTAA negotiations to drive home the truth 
that labour rights and trade are bound up with each other and that, under 
certain circumstances, violators will be punished. Realistically, economic 
sanctions should only be a last, extreme resort when all intermediate 
opportunities for settling problems have been exhausted. But unless the 
possibility of sanctions exists, stubborn companies and governments can 
resist change with impunity. 
A possible innovation in the FTAA would be to allow complaining 
parties like workers, unions and NGOs to "appeal" cases to higher levels, 
forcing the creation of independent evaluation committees and arbitral 
panels that can make binding recommendations and impose sanctions. 
This would further engage civil society actors in the process and provide 
new opportunities for negotiated settlements before any sanctions are 
applied. 
Effective enforcement of national law 
The NAALC and agreements modeled on the NAALC (United States -
Chile, Canada-Chile, Canada-Costa-Rica) all make "effective enforce-
ment" of national labour laws a central obligation of the parties, distinct 
from a need to change laws to comply with new supranational standards. 
This is a reasonable starting point for a new hemispheric agreement, as 
long as national laws comport with fundamental rights. 
The capacity for enforcement is critical to protecting workers' rights. 
One need only see the re-emergence of apparel sweatshops in many US 
cities or the well-documented failure of US authorities to protect workers' 
organizing rights to appreciate that effective enforcement of national law 
is a general problem, not one limited to poor countries. Fixing it should 
be a priority in hemispheric trade. This threshold promise to improve 
performance by enforcing national laws is one that countries can readily 
accept. 
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Commitment to enforcing national laws creates a threshold problem: what 
about laws that are inadequate or that outright violate workers' rights? 
This is a central problem in current negotiations between the USA and 
Central American countries on a Central America Free Trade Agreement 
(CAFTA). Several of these countries' laws fall short of compliance with 
international standards on fundamental workers' rights.36 
Here is where a strong normative statement setting baseline standards 
comes into play. The NAALC and NAALC-based agreements all contain 
eleven "labour principles" covering freedom of association, forced labour, 
child labour, discrimination, safety and health, migrant worker protection 
and more. CARICOM's Charter of Civil Society and Mercosur's Social-
Labour Declaration go further, addressing all the NAALC principles as 
well as social dialogue, job training and promotions, protection against 
dismissal, maternity leave, social security and other issues. 
It is worth noting at this point that all of these instruments extend 
beyond the ILO's four-part definition of core labour standards: freedom 
of association, elimination of forced labour, abolition of child labour and 
elimination of discrimination at work. Indeed, labour rights advocates in 
the Americas can make an important stand by not limiting their discourse 
to ILO core standards. The ILO's core definition is important, but focusing 
just on them invites the logical conclusion that other labour rights and 
standards, mostly dealing with economic and social rights, are less worthy 
of attention because they fall outside the "core". Governments in this 
hemisphere have already created broader definitions of workers' rights. 
Labour rights supporters should build upon this "core-plus" approach in 
the FTAA. 
A sustained independent review process 
Implicit in the charter-like statements on workers' rights in the Americas 
is an assumption that countries' laws honour them. In many cases, they 
do not. Central American countries are not alone in the region in falling 
short of international norms. Mexico's labour law makes it difficult for 
workers to dislodge a corrupt, undemocratic union. Chile's labour code 
bars company-wide and industry-wide bargaining. Ecuador and other 
countries' labour laws allow employers to string together "temporary" 
employment contracts to frustrate workers' organizing rights. US labour 
/* 
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law fails to protect the rights of millions of workers to organize by exclud-
ing them from coverage under the National Labour Relations Act or other 
protections of the right to organize. Furthermore, Canada has come under 
consistent criticism from the ILO for denying associational rights to var-
ious categories of public employees.37 
At least some elements of most countries' labour laws violate interna-
tional standards. It would be unrealistic to expect wholesale, immediate, 
pro-worker labour law reforms throughout the hemisphere as part of 
a trade deal. However, the implicit commitment to meet basic norms 
of decency expressed in existing labour rights clauses in the Americas 
can be made explicit. As part of a hemispheric agreement, countries 
could agree to thoroughly review their labour laws with help from 
a neutral, non-governmental international body such as the Interna-
tional Society for Labour Law and Social Security or the International 
Industrial Relations Association, or perhaps in collaboration with ILO 
experts, that can shape recommendations and a plan for change where 
needed. 
The purpose of a sustained review process would not be to hold trade 
hostage until every nation's labour code is pristine. Rather, the goal is 
to create incentives for positive labour law reforms by accelerating trade 
benefits for countries moving swiftly in order to bring their laws into 
compliance with international norms. In other words, we should reverse 
the race to the bottom dynamic, not only by removing incentives to keep 
low labour standards to attract investment, but by adding incentives to 
harmonize labour standards upward to gain trade benefits.38 
Conclusion 
A comprehensive overview of helpful and harmful language in existing 
labour rights agreements in the Americas is beyond the scope of this paper. 
The purpose of this paper has been to provide some examples for the 
argument that governments negotiating a hemispheric trade pact should 
include a viable workers' rights chapter by building upon models that 
have already been freely adopted. For example, the United States, Mexico 
and Canada can say to Central American, Mercosur and Caribbean island 
countries, "We like the way you developed an institutional role for trade 
unions and NGOs; let's weave together the best threads of what we have 
each accomplished in a new cloak of protection for workers' rights in 
this hemisphere." This way, the larger countries can approach the smaller 
countries on the basis of equality, not imposition. 
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This is not to say that labour rights advocates should be content with 
patching together current models. We should also demand new provisions 
that advance workers' interests. For example, an FTAA labour rights chap-
ter should specify that a substantial portion of the budget of a labour rights 
commission or secretariat created under the labour agreement ought to 
be devoted to cross-border educational work such as conference support 
and research grants to trade unions and non-governmental organizations. 
Another clause should provide heightened transparency in hemispheric 
labour affairs, requiring a "labour information audit" of companies 
involved in FTAA commerce. Audit information should be provided to 
and posted on the website of an FTAA labour secretariat with information 
such as corporate ownership structure, the location of facilities and their 
products or service lines, the number of employees, their salaries, benefits 
and working hours, the unionization status of any groups of employees, 
copies of collective bargaining agreements, and other relevant informa-
tion. 
In addition, a clause based on the principle of compliance with national 
law should be incorporated. This would allow targeted trade sanctions 
against companies found guilty of repeated violations of national labour 
laws linked to labour principles or other charter-like statements in an 
FTAA labour rights chapter. 
This is all easy to say in a policy paper. The hard part in months and 
years ahead will be building a cross-border movement of trade unions and 
allies to demand an effective labour rights chapter in a hemispheric trade 
agreement - and a credible threat to defeat an agreement if governments 
fail to include such a chapter. 
The fate of the FTAA does not hinge only on labour rights. Other 
"killers" stalk an agreement, like NAFTA's "investor-state" chapter letting 
corporations sue governments for regulatory actions harming profits and 
corporate pressure to privatize basic social services. Other social demands, 
if unmet, should also force labour advocates to join a struggle to defeat the 
FTAA, like the need for environmental protection, debt relief, equitable 
agricultural trade, guarantees of democracy, and sustainable development 
policies that include North-South economic aid. 
Labour rights advocates are not alone in their struggle to build a strong 
social dimension into the architecture of hemispheric trade and invest-
ment. We should offer to engage governments with realistic proposals for 
a viable labour rights chapter in an agreement of the Americas building 
upon what countries have already done and not demand totally new and 
untested instruments and mechanisms. We should also be ready to join 
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allies in other social movements to kill an FTAA that fails a broad test of 
social justice. 
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